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Abstract
In this paper, we take an analytical approach to examine possible ad-
verse effects of the use of inflation targeting as a disinflation regime. The
idea is that a strict interpretation of an inflation target may preserve in-
flationary distortions after price stability is attained. We show that such
a policy not only creates a slump in output but may increase macroeco-
nomic volatility substantially in a model in which wages are subject to a
Taylor staggering structure.
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1 Introduction
Inflation targeting has become increasingly popular as a monetary policy regime.
A distinctive feature of many emerging market economies among the inflation
targeters regards the level of the inflation rate exhibited at the time of adoption
of the policy. Industrial countries have adopted inflation targeting at inflation
rates at least broadly consistent with price stability. In contrast, emerging mar-
ket economies such as Mexico, Hungary or Poland exhibited initial inflation
rates of around 10 percent or more.1 This study is concerned with the macroe-
conomic effects of the explicit use of inflation targeting as a disinflation regime.
The argument we make is that a strict inflation targeting policy employed for
the purpose of disinflation may preserve inflationary distortions to an unusually
large degree. In our model, these excess distortions not only cause slumps in
real activity, but may additionally increase macroeconomic volatility.
An extensive literature has analyzed inflation targeting with regard to its
properties as a monetary policy regime under price stability. Its advantages have
been documented by, among others, Bernanke and Mishkin (1997), Svensson
(1997) and Svensson and Woodford (2003). In an early contribution, Svensson
(2000) differentiates between flexible and strict inflation targeting and shows
that the former creates substantially less output variability than a strict inter-
pretation of the policy, as it effectively targets inflation at a longer horizon.
The present paper somewhat reinforces this result by showing that the sub-
optimality of strict inflation targeting may be even more severe in the context
of a disinflation episode. Yun (2005) applies a similar line of reasoning as we
do in this paper. He shows that the zero inflation optimality result (Woodford,
1999; Gali, 2000) must be refined in the presence of initial price dispersion.2 The
reason is that the pre-existing price dispersion adversely affects real activity in
the economy and converges faster under alternative policies.3
The literature on the real effects of disinflations has concentrated on explain-
ing stylized facts regarding the differential real effects of money- and exchange-
rate-based disinflations. Among others, Ball (1994) and Ascari and Rankin
1See Landerretche (2001), Schmidt-Hebbel and Tapia (2002), Levin et al (2004), Roger
and Stone (2005) and Batini et al (2006)
2Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) show that in a general class of sticky price dynamic gen-
eral equilibrium (DSGE) models, consumer welfare can be well approximated by a quadratic
loss function in inflation and real activity. It can be shown that welfare losses are then propor-
tional to a discounted sum of squared deviations of the current inflation rate from a moving
average of recent past inflation rates, rather than deviations from zero (Sheedy, 2005). Gi-
annoni and Woodford (2005) conclude that inflation should not be reduced too abruptly if it
has been allowed to exceed its optimal long-run level.
3The stabilization policy examined in Yun (2005) does not increase macroeconomic volatil-
ity. The reason is that the author uses Calvo (1983) price contracts. We elaborate on this
below.
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(2002) consider explanations for the finding that money-based disinflations typ-
ically cause slumps in output on impact. Exchange-rate-based policies, on the
other hand, are frequently characterized by initial booms in real activity. Calvo
and Vegh (1994) replicate this empirical finding by assuming that a collapse of
the disinflation policy is rationally anticipated. Fender and Rankin (2008) ex-
plain the boom with the endogeneity of money supply and its ability to satisfy
the excess demand for money balances following a disinflation.4 The long run
impact of disinflation policies in the framework of the New Keynesian model
is discussed in Blanchard and Gali (2007) and Ascari and Merkl (2007). The
present study is motivated by the idea that inflation targeting differs from other
disinflation policies in important respects. In particular, a strict interpretation
of an inflation target allows the policymaker to tolerate only minor deviations
from target. But adjusting the policy instrument such that the inflation rate
is reduced to a new target and defending this target rigorously must preserve
inflationary distortions such as wage and price differentials to an exceptional
degree.
In this paper, we use a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model with wage
staggering of the type suggested by Taylor (1979a) to consider a rather extreme
case of a disinflation exercise: an immediate and permanent reduction in the
rate of CPI inflation to a newly set target. We interpret this policy as strict
inflation targeting during a disinflation episode. The central bank sets the path
of money supply such that the newly set inflation target is attained immediately
and sustained throughout future periods. The particular nature of the policy
requires us to solve the model in a rather unconventional way. We first impose
the result of the disinflation policy, a reduction to a lower rate of CPI inflation,
and then solve for the policy itself, i.e. the path that money supply has to follow
in order to sustain the new inflation target throughout the future.
We consider both a closed and an open economy version of the model econ-
omy. As briefly mentioned above, we find that the disinflation policy we consider
not only creates a slump in output on impact, but can additionally generate os-
cillatory behavior in both nominal and real variables along their post-disinflation
adjustment path. The reason is that the immediate reduction in price inflation
requires the real wage to fluctuate for some periods before it gradually converges
to its new steady state. The oscillations can be permanent, such that the post-
disinflation path of the economy is not saddlepath stable, when the economy is
closed and the returns to labor in the production function are constant. From a
modeling perspective, the presence of oscillations along the adjustment path is
4Kolver-Hernandez (2007) achieves a similar result by introducing elements of state-
dependent pricing into the model economy.
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a result that would not obtain in a model with a Calvo (1983) type staggering
structure. We show that this is because price setters in such a model would
always set prices equal to the prevailing price level. In the framework of our
model, we distinguish two cases: one in which the economy is indeed character-
ized by oscillatory behavior along its post-disinflation path and one in which it
reacts similarly to a conventional disinflation policy. Strikingly, the size of the
initial slowdown in real activity is strongly positively related to the presence of
oscillations along the adjustment path.
The presence and the magnitude of oscillations along the economy’s adjust-
ment path depend on the degree to which wages need to fluctuate in order to
keep the inflation rate at the newly set target. Important determinants are thus
the desired size of the reduction in the inflation rate as well as the returns to
labor in the production function and the degree of openness of the economy.
Greater returns to scale generate oscillations as they imply that wages are tied
more closely to the behavior of prices. The degree of openness matters because
the exchange rate acts as a stabilizer along the post-disinflation path of the
economy by effectively relieving wages of part of the burden of reducing the
inflation rate. The more open is the economy, the greater is the share of the
burden it can successfully manage. In particular, we find that there are no os-
cillations at all along the post-disinflation path of the economy if the returns to
labor and the degree of openness are sufficiently low. At the other extreme, in
the case of constant returns to scale and a closed economy, the oscillations are
large and permanent. The latter is thus the only case in which the economy
does not gradually converge to a new steady state. When we investigate the
policy’s effects in the framework of the full nonlinear model instead of in a log-
linear version of it, another particularity of this special case emerges. It turns
out that the policymaker faces a surprisingly strict feasibility constraint that
does not allow for the policy to be carried out in virtually any case of empirical
relevance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the im-
plications of our disinflation policy in a closed economy setting and highlights
the degree of returns to scale as a decisive factor in determining the magnitude
of the oscillations in the post-disinflation state. In Section 3, we extend the
analysis to an open economy setting and discuss the role of the exchange rate as
a stabilizer as well as the importance of the degree of openness of the economy.
The section closes with an analysis of the disinflation policy’s impact on the
economy in the framework of the full nonlinear version of the model. Section 4
concludes.
4
2 Disinflation via Inflation Targeting in the Closed
Economy
2.1 The Model Economy
In this section, we employ a closed economy Dynamic General Equilibrium
Model with imperfect competition in the labor market and nominal wage rigidi-
ties of the type proposed by Taylor (1979). The structure of the model is kept
simple which allows us to illustrate our main points in a clean way and to derive
crucial results analytically. We omit derivations where they are standard in the
literature.
The model economy is inhabited by a continuum of households jǫ[0, 1] and
firms. The supply side of the economy produces a single consumption good
using a technology in which labor is the only variable factor of production
Yt = N
σ
t (2.1)
where Yt is output at time t, σ is the degree of returns to labor and 0 <
σ ≤ 1. A typical firm demands a continuum of labor types jǫ[0, 1] to minimize
the cost of achieving a particular composite labor input Nt, given by Nt =
[
∫ 1
0 L
(ε−1)/ε
jt dj]
ε/(ε−1). Ljt is the quantity of labor that household j supplies to
the firm and ε > 1 is the elasticity of technical substitution across labor types.
Solving the cost minimization problem yields the standard conditional demand
for labor function
Ljt = Nt(
Wt
Wjt
)ε (2.2)
where Wt is the wage index given by Wt = [
∫ 1
0 W
1−ε
jt dj]
1/(1−ε). Goods
markets are perfectly competitive. The firm’s profit maximization problem thus
yields the supply function
Yt = Nt(
Wt
σPt
)σ/(σ−1) (2.3)
We now move to the demand side of the economy. Household j supplies labor
skill jǫ[0, 1] and sets its own wageWjt. We assume that the economy consists of
two sectors of households. Sector A comprises labor types [0, 0.5) and sector B
comprises labor types [0.5, 1]. Although households are monopolistic suppliers of
their individual type of labor input, they are price takers in all other markets.
We assume that they are completely symmetric in terms of their preference
structure which implies that consumption must be equal across households in
a given sector at any point in time. We also assume the existence of complete
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domestic asset markets. This implies that households can insure against any
type of initial shock that might affect the two sectors differently due to the
staggering structure to be defined below. Hence, Cjt = Ckt must hold for any
two given households j and k in sectors A and B. Finally, we define aggregate
nominal consumption as St = PtCt where Pt is the price of one unit of the
composite consumption good.
Wages are set by each individual household subject to a staggering structure
of the type proposed by Taylor (1979). In particular, we assume that house-
holds in sector A (B) set their wage in even (odd) periods and keep it fixed for
the subsequent period. The wage newly set in period t is denoted by Xt inde-
pendently of the sector in which it is set. Households are utility maximizers.
A representative household j in sector A derives utility from consumption, liq-
uidity holdings and leisure and maximizes her discounted lifetime utility Uj by
choosing a pattern for personal consumption Cjt, bond holdings Bjt, wagesWjt
and labor effort Njt subject to a series of budget constraints, the conditional
demand for labor and the wage setting constraint:
Uj =
∞∑
t=0
βt[δlnCjt + (1− δ)ln(Mjt/Pt)− ηL
ζ
jt] (2.4)
subject to
Mjt−1 + It−1Bjt−1 +WjtLjt +Πt +Gt = PtCjt +Mjt +Bjt (2.5)
Ljt = Nt(
Wt
Wjt
)ε (2.6)
Wjt =Wjt+1 = Xt, t = 0, 2, 4, ... (2.7)
where only the first two constraints must hold in all periods t = 0, 1, 2, 3, ...
and where β < 1, ζ ≥ 1, It is the domestic gross interest rate,Mt denotes money
supply in period t, Gt is a lump-sum subsidy to households and Πt denotes
a share in firms’ profits that is equal across households.5 The optimization
problem for household k in sector B is exactly equivalent except that the wage
setting constraint holds in odd instead of even periods. The first order conditions
of this optimization problem are given by the consumption Euler equation, the
money demand optimality condition and the optimal wage setting condition
5A no-Ponzi-game condition ensures that individuals cannot borrow infinitely by repaying
debt with further debt.
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Cjt+1 = β[It
Pt
Pt+1
]Cjt (2.8)
Mjt
Pt
= Cjt
1− δ
δ
It
It − 1
(2.9)
Xt = [
ε
ε− 1
ηζ
δ
Lζjt + βL
ζ
jt+1
Ljt
PtCjt
+ β
Ljt+1
Pt+1Cjt+1
] (2.10)
The model economy further comprises a government that controls money
supply. Its budget constraint is given by
Gt =Mt −Mt−1 (2.11)
The competitive equilibrium in the model economy is the sequence of prices
[Xjt, Pt]
∞
t=0 and allocations [Yt, Cjt, Njt, Ljt, Bjt,Mjt]
∞
t=0 such that firms max-
imize profits, agents maximize utility and all markets clear.6 We aggregate
the equilibrium conditions across individuals and take a log-linear approxima-
tion around a reference steady state in which inflation is zero. Notice that in
what follows we will distinguish between the reference zero inflation steady state
(ZISS) around which the equilibrium conditions are linearized and a constant
inflation steady state (CISS) in which the economy finds itself one period be-
fore the disinflation policy is applied. As the economy is closed, bond holdings
are zero in both states.7 The linearized equilibrium conditions are presented in
Appendix A.8
2.2 Strict Inflation Targeting as a Disinflation Policy
We now proceed to assess the macroeconomic effects of a disinflation policy
that uses strict inflation targeting to reduce the rate of CPI inflation from a
positive to a non-negative value. We define strict inflation targeting following
Svensson (2000). The definition implies that the policymaker only cares about
stabilizing inflation at a given target. We assume that she has perfect control
over the inflation rate and adjusts her policy instrument such that inflation
is kept at target at any point in time. The economy is initially in a constant
inflation steady state (CISS) in which real variables are constant and all nominal
variables grow at some constant inflation rate µI . The policymaker decides
6Due to the staggering structure in wages the labor market does not clear in the Walrasian
sense.
7While this must necessarily be the case in a closed economy setting, we will impose it
upon the open economy by assumption in the next section
8The interested reader may refer to Fender and Rankin (2008) for the linearization of the
wage setting condition.
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to reduce inflation in period t = 0 from its initial rate µI to the lower but
nonnegative value µD. This policy change is unexpected and credible. The
policymaker takes action by announcing µD as the new target and adjusts the
path of money supply such that the new target is attained immediately and
sustained throughout future periods.9
There is no doubt that this disinflation policy is more rigid than policies
applied in the real world. However, we present this extreme example as a
benchmark case that allows for an analytical characterization of possible ad-
verse effects of applying a too rigid inflation targeting policy for the purpose
of disinflation. The definition of the policy requires us to solve the model in a
rather unconventional way. We first impose the result of the disinflation pol-
icy, a reduction in the rate of inflation from µI to µD, and then solve for the
path that the money supply needs to follow in order to achieve and sustain the
newly set inflation target. Finally, we assess the macroeconomic effects of the
disinflation policy.
2.2.1 The Initial Constant Inflation Steady State
Before we can investigate the macroeconomic impact of the disinflation policy,
we need to solve for the equilibrium solution of the model in the initial CISS.
We use the fact that the new wage xt is homogeneous of degree one in nominal
variables and, when normalized by money supply such that vt = xt − mt, is
constant over time at
v = −
1
2γ
[
− γ
1 + β
1− β
+
1− β
1 + β
]
µI (2.12)
with γ = ζ1+ε(ζ−1) . The CISS value of nontradables output is then given by
y =
σ(1 − β)
2(1 + β)γ
µI (2.13)
We observe that nontradables output is affected positively by the inflation
rate in the CISS. The effect is due to wage setters discounting future utility
and is more closely discussed in Appendix C in the context of the full nonlinear
model. In the CISS, all nominal variables grow at the rate µI . Defining m−1
as the level of money supply one period before the disinflation policy is applied,
we can write the wage index in the same period as
w−1 = −
1
2
[ −2β
1− β
+
1− β
(1 + β)γ
]
µI +m−1 (2.14)
9There is a unique path of money supply, the exchange rate and the nominal interest rate
that achieves this outcome. It is therefore not of importance, whether we think of the central
bank as using one or the other as its policy instrument.
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Equations (2.13) and (2.14) constitute the CISS solution of the model one
period before disinflation.
The next step in the analysis is to understand, how changes in the rate of
price inflation affect the rest of the economy and in particular the staggered
variable, wages. The supply function (A.5) allows us to write the price index as
a function of labor demand and the wage index
pt =
σ
1− σ
yt + wt (2.15)
The equation illustrates that a given change in the price level is accommo-
dated partly by a reaction of wages and partly by firms adjusting production.
The wage level’s share in facilitating the price change depends positively on the
degree of returns to labor. The reason is that a larger σ implies a less strongly
upward sloping marginal cost curve and thus a weaker response of prices to
changes in the level of production in the economy. When σ = 1, the marginal
cost curve is constant, leaving no role for output in the determination of prices.
This implies that the wage level must move one for one with the price index. In
the context of our disinflation policy the latter case implies that a reduction in
the rate of price inflation translates one for one into a reduction in the growth
rate of the wage index. The subsequent section will show that this particularity
allows for a purely analytic characterization of the disinflation policy’s impact
on the economy.
2.2.2 The Special Case: Constant Returns to Scale
We begin by solving for the impact of the disinflation policy in the special case
of constant returns to scale. We do so because the distinctive implications of
this assumption allow for a good understanding of the channels through which
the policy affects the economy.
As a starting point, it is important to notice that there is a crucial implica-
tion arising from the assumption of constant returns to scale in the production
function. In particular, equation (A.5) shows that this is the one and only case
for which it is not possible to solve for output when the paths of both the wage
index and the price level are known. The reason is that the aggregate supply
curve, i.e. the relationship between output and the price level, is horizontal for
a given wage. This implies that conventional solution techniques cannot be ap-
plied to determine the full post-disinflation solution of the model, a point that
will perhaps become more obvious when we examine the general case of σ < 1
in the next section.
There is, however, another anomaly about the case of constant returns to
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scale. In the previous subsection we have discussed that σ = 1 implies that
the wage index moves one for one with the price index and a policy of reducing
CPI inflation effectively becomes one of reducing the growth rate of the wage
index. Using this fact, it turns out to be possible to directly solve for the post-
disinflation path of the real side of the economy by distinguishing the economy’s
law of motion in even periods from the law of motion in odd periods. To see this,
remember that our disinflation policy reduces CPI inflation from its initial rate
µI to a lower but non-negative rate µD. Given that the wage index moves one
for one with prices, it is easy to see what such a policy implies for the behavior
of sectoral wages. We take the wage index and its one period lag. We evaluate
the difference at t = 0. This yields
w0 − w−1 =
1
2
(x0 − x−1) +
1
2
(x−1 − x−2) (2.16)
We have assumed that the economy is in a CISS up until period t = 0. It
follows that the second term on the RHS is predetermined and equal to 12µI .
Reducing inflation to µD in period t = 0 then implies that the LHS of (2.16) is
equal to µD. Hence,
x0 − x−1 = 2µD − µI (2.17)
Following the equivalent procedure for the subsequent periods, we have
xt − xt−1 = 2µD − µI (2.18)
for all t = 0, 2, 4, . . . ,∞, and
xt − xt−1 = µI (2.19)
for all t = 1, 3, 5, . . . ,∞. In other words, wages grow at the constant rate
2µD from one even period to the other and from one odd period to the other.
But, since µD < µI the new wage grows faster from even to odd periods than
from odd to even periods. Three cases are possible. First, if 2µD < µI , the new
wage set in even periods is lower than the wage set in the previous odd period.
Wages in sector A are thus smaller than wages in sector B throughout the post-
disinflation state. Second, if 2µD > µI , the new wage set in even periods is
higher than the wage set in the previous odd period. Third, if 2µD = µI , the
new wage set in even periods is equal to the prevailing one from the previous
odd period.
Figure 1 illustrates these three cases. The special case of µD = 0 is repre-
sented by Case 1b. It represents a complete disinflation, i.e. a reduction in the
rate of inflation from µI to zero. In particular, µD = 0 implies that
10
Figure 1: Post-Disinflation Path of the New Wage
x−2 = x0 = x2 = ... = w−1 −
1
2
µI (2.20)
x−1 = x1 = x3 = ... = w−1 +
1
2
µI (2.21)
That is to say that the disinflation policy produces a wage gap between the
two sectors of households that is constant and permanent. The intuition is the
following: we impose zero wage inflation from period zero onwards. The wage
set in period t = −2 is smaller than the one set in period t = −1. This implies
that the wage index requires downward pressure by the new wage set in period
zero to ensure zero wage inflation. Due to the fact that the wage index is an
equally weighted average of the two sectoral wages, the necessary amount of
downward pressure is achieved if the wage in period t = 0 is set equal to wage
set in period t = −2. The opposite reasoning applies in the subsequent period.
Let us get back to the more general case of a reduction in the rate of wage
inflation from a constant value µI to a lower positive value µD. Having deter-
mined the wage setting behavior of households after the disinflation policy is
introduced, we can now derive the entire post disinflation state of the economy.
We substitute for both the wage index and employment in the wage setting
condition (A.21) and obtain
xt =
1
1 + β
[
st
2γ
1 + γ
+ xt−1
1− γ
1 + γ
]
+
β
1 + β
[
st+1
2γ
1 + γ
+ xt+1
1− γ
1 + γ
]
(2.22)
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As we are in effect imposing different wages for even and odd periods exoge-
nously, we will have to look at every period separately. Using the wage setting
condition (A.21) and substituting from equations (2.20) and (2.21), we have
that
st +
1
β
st−1 =
1 + β
β
(w−1 +
1
2
µI + tµD)−
1− γ
2γ
(2µD −
1 + β
β
µI) (2.23)
st+
1
β
st−1 =
1 + β
β
(w−1−
1
2
µI +(t+1)µD)−
1− γ
2γ
(
1 + β
β
µI −
1
β
2µD) (2.24)
in odd and even periods respectively. These relationships hold from period
zero onwards. A similar relationship between s0 and s−1 would be convenient
as it would uniquely determine the post disinflation path of st. However, the
equivalent procedure would give us a relationship between s−1 and the expec-
tation of s0 as of period t = −1. And this expectation is false as soon as the
disinflation policy is introduced. The reason is that, in period t = −1, the wage
setter does, by assumption, not know that the disinflation policy will be applied.
Nominal consumption in the subsequent period then turns out to be different
from his expectation as of period t = −1. But we can get around this problem
by appealing to stability reasoning. From (2.23) and (2.24), we have that in
odd and even periods respectively
st+2−
1
β2
st = µD
β2 − 1
β2
t+
β2 − 1
β2
w−1−µI(
1 + β
β
)2
1
2γ
+µD(3+
2β − γ
β2γ
) (2.25)
st+2 −
1
β2
st = µD
β2 − 1
β2
t+
β2 − 1
β2
w−1 + µI(
1 + β
β
)2
1
2γ
+ µD(3−
γ + 1 + β2
β2γ
)
(2.26)
Equations (2.25) and (2.26) are the basic laws of motion of the economy in
the post disinflation state. In order to arrive at a stationary solution, we deflate
both difference equations by the wage level wt. We create the new variable at
defined as the ratio at = st − wt. The resulting first order difference equations
in at take the form
at+2 =
1
β2
at + constant (2.27)
Since β < 1, the Eigenvalue of these equations is greater than one and
unstable. This implies that there is a unique non divergent solution for each
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of these processes as Blanchard and Kahn (1980) show. This non divergent
solution obtains when at is equal across odd and across even periods. The
economy instantly jumps to its post disinflation state and remains there. Using
the goods supply and demand functions, we find
yNodd =
(1 + β)
2(1− β)γ
µI −
2β
(1− β2)γ
µD (2.28)
yNeven = −
(1 + β)
2(1− β)γ
µI +
(1 + β2)
(1− β2)γ
µD (2.29)
As is evident from equations (2.28) and (2.29), the disinflation policy results
in output oscillations between even and odd periods. The amplitude of these
oscillations is constant. Moreover, we can observe that the extent to which
nominal and real variables fluctuate depends positively on the initial inflation
rate and negatively on the post-disinflation rate. The reason is that the inflation
rate determines the degree of wage dispersion present in the initial CISS. This
suggests that a more gradual path of disinflation may attenuate the increase
in output volatility resulting from the disinflation policy. The intuition for
these findings becomes clear when the post disinflation path of money supply
is derived. We have explained above that the policy instrument is endogenous
in our solution procedure although it is exogenous in the interpretation of the
policy experiment. Notice first that nominal consumption can be expressed as
st = yt + wt (2.30)
Given the path of output documented in (2.28) and (2.29), and given that
the wage index grows at the rate µD from period to period, we observe that
post disinflation nominal consumption also grows at a lower rate in even periods
than it does in odd periods. The post-disinflation path of money supply is given
as a function of the path of nominal consumption
mt =
β
1− β
(
1
β
st − st+1) (2.31)
It is easy to see that money supply must follow a pattern that is qualitatively
similar to the path of wages and output. The intuition is the following: the
disinflation policy effectively imposes a path for the new wage that requires
agents to set low wages in even periods and high wages in odd periods. In order
to motivate this wage setting behavior, money supply must be set low in even
and high in odd periods. This also explains the oscillatory behavior of output.
Finally, we can see that average output in the post-disinflation state is lower
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than output in the initial CISS.10 This is to say that the disinflation policy
creates a slump in production.11
2.2.3 The General Case: Decreasing Returns to Scale
We now abstract from the assumption of constant returns to scale and return to
the more general case of σ < 1. The analysis in the previous section has shown
that the disinflation policy can result in oscillations in sectoral real wages that
are permanent and constant over time. In this section, we show that this result
is not robust to relaxing the assumption of σ = 1. In particular, we show that in
the more general case the economy is indeed saddlepath stable and ultimately
converges to a new steady state. The transition path may or may not be subject
to oscillations, depending on the particular value of σ.
We investigate the effects of the disinflation policy in a different way than
in the previous section. The reason is that it is now possible to derive the
entire post-disinflation path of the economy by determining the response of the
staggering variable wages to the reduction in price inflation. We again consider
a reduction in the rate of price inflation from µI to µD in period zero. In
particular, taking equation (2.22) and substituting for nominal consumption st
using the definition (A.2) and the supply function (A.5), we can express the
new wage in period t solely as a function of past and future wages as well as
the price index
xt =
1
1 + β
[
2γ
1 + γ
(
1
1− σ
pt −
1
2
σ
1− σ
(xt + xt−1)) +
1− γ
1 + γ
xt−1]
+
β
1 + β
[
2γ
1 + γ
(
1
1− σ
pt+1 −
1
2
σ
1− σ
(xt+1 + xt)) +
1− γ
1 + γ
xt+1] (2.32)
In the post-disinflation state pt and pt+1 = pt + µD are exogenous and
predetermined by definition of the disinflation policy. Therefore, the households
wage setting condition can, from period t = 0 onwards, be expressed as
xt+1 −
1 + β
β
1− σ + γ
1− σ − γ
xt +
1
β
xt−1 = −
1 + β
β
2γ
1− σ − γ
(pt +
β
1 + β
µD) (2.33)
10But output is greater or equal than in the ZISS. The reason is that the discounting effect
of inflation on output is not only present in the initial CISS but also, albeit attenuated, in
the post-disinflation state.
11It is typically found that money based disinflations cause a slump in output on impact,
while exchange rate based disinflations can cause a boom. Explanations for these empirical
findings can be found in Calvo and Vegh (1994), Rebelo and Vegh (1995), Fender and Rankin
(2006) or Kolver Hernandez (2007).
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This is the law of motion of the economy in the post-disinflation steady state.
Notice that pt is growing over time so that we need to stationarize the equation
before we can solve it. We do so by defining φt = xt − pt and obtain
φt+1 −
1 + β
β
1− σ + γ
1− σ − γ
φt +
1
β
φt−1 = µD(
1− β
β
−
2γ
1− σ − γ
) (2.34)
As we show in Appendix B.1, (2.34) is saddlepoint stable when σ < 1, i.e.
one of its eigenvalues lies within and the other outside the unit circle. This
result holds for any choice of parameter values within the defined limits.12 We
use the eigenvalue-eigenvector solution technique of Blanchard and Kahn (1980)
to solve for the post-disinflation path of φt. As (2.34) is a scalar second order
difference equation and its RHS is constant over time, its rational expectations
solution is given by
φt = λ1φt−1 − µD
(1− β)/β − 2γ/(1− ασ − γ)
λ2 − 1
(2.35)
where λ1 denotes the eigenvalue that is smaller in absolute value and λ2
denotes the one that is bigger. Knowing both the path of the price index and
the normalized sectoral wages φt, it is straightforward to derive the entire post-
disinflation path of the economy. In reference to the previous section, notice that
this would not have been possible in the special case of constant returns to scale
in the production function. The reason is that the aggregate supply curve in
this case is horizontal for a given wage level, implying that the post-disinflation
path of the real economy could not be derived from knowledge about the path
of prices and wages.
Whether the path of the economy is subject to oscillations as in the case
of wage inflation targeting now crucially depends on the sign of the smaller
eigenvalue. Appendix B.2 shows that the smaller eigenvalue is of negative sign,
and thus induces oscillations, if and only if 1 − σ − γ < 0 holds, where γ =
ζ
1+ε(ζ−1) . This is to say that the post-disinflation path of the economy exhibits
oscillations for a sufficiently large σ and sufficiently small ζ and ε.
We study the impact of the disinflation policy in both situations using the
example of an initial inflation rate of two percent and a complete elimination in
price inflation after the policy is applied. We first investigate the case in which
1 − σ − γ < 0 holds.13 Figure 2 illustrates the resulting path of the economy.
As in the case of wage inflation targeting, we observe strong oscillations in both
nominal and real variables after the disinflation policy is applied. The new wage
12When σ = 1, this is not the case and the economy is not saddlepath stable.
13We choose a rather extreme parametrization with σ = 0.9, ζ = 1.3 and ε = 4.
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Figure 2: Price Inflation Targeting with Oscillations
falls on impact, oscillates for a few periods, and then gradually converges to its
ZISS value. Money supply and output behave similarly. Moreover, average out-
put from period zero onwards is substantially lower than prior to the application
of the policy. The policy therefore not only increases macroeconomic volatility
but also creates a fall in output. In the impact period of the policy, there is a
drop of more than 2 percent in real activity.
These results are somewhat similar to the previously discussed special case
of constant returns to scale in the production function. However, the crucial
difference is that the economy is indeed saddlepath stable and converges over
time after some periods of increased volatility. The reason is related to the
assumption of decreasing returns to labor. As discussed previously, firms now
face upward sloping marginal cost curves, which relieves wages of part of the
burden of responding to desired changes in the price level or its growth rate.
And the weaker is the response of wages in the impact period of the shock, the
weaker will be the response in the subsequent period. Hence, the magnitude
of the fluctuations in the economy decreases over time. The smaller is σ, the
more rapidly this process takes place. The attenuating effect is strengthened
the greater is the elasticity of substitution between labor types ε and the greater
is the elasticity of the disutility of labor ζ. 14
Let us now focus on the case of 1−σ−γ > 0 in which σ is small enough and ε
14Regarding ε, the reason is that a higher substitutability of labor types implies that a given
firm will employ more labor of the low wage type in period t = 0. This reduces the wage
index and implies that the new wage set in period t = 0 does not have to be as low as would
have been the case otherwise. A higher disutility per unit of work effort, on the other hand,
scales wages upward and thus also scales the wage gap between one sector and the other.
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Figure 3: Price Inflation Targeting without Oscillations
and ζ are large enough such that there are no oscillations in the post-disinflation
state. We choose σ = 0.1 and leave all remaining parameter values the same as
in the previous case. Figure 3 shows that there are now indeed no oscillations in
the post-disinflation path of the economy. All variables monotonically converge
to their ZISS levels. In fact, the post-disinflation path of output reminds us of
the one that is typically attained under a conventional disinflation policy in a
model with a staggering structure in wages or prices.
To sum up, the analysis has shown that a strict inflation targeting policy
employed to reduce CPI inflation will result in a slump in output on impact
and may create oscillations of a substantial magnitude in both nominal and
real variables. The presence of oscillations in the post-disinflation path of the
economy crucially depends on the degree of returns to labor in the production
function. For a large enough σ the disinflation policy will result in oscillatory
behavior of both real and nominal variables. These oscillations die out more
slowly over time the larger is σ and are permanent in the limiting case of σ = 1.
Finally, notice that the slump in output following the disinflation policy is tiny
when there are no post-disinflation oscillations in the economy and substantial
if there are.
2.2.4 Digression: Calvo Staggering Structure
In this section we briefly show that the post-disinflation oscillations in response
to our disinflation policy would not obtain in a model with a staggering structure
as proposed by Calvo (1983). This is the reason why the policy experiment of
Yun (2005) does not lead to an equivalent conclusion.
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Following Yun and much of the literature, let us consider the case of price
inflation targeting in an economy in which prices are subject to a Calvo-type
staggering structure. We can write the price index in the absence of indexation
as
P 1−εt = (1− α)P
1−ε
t,t + αP
1−ε
t−1 (2.36)
where Pt is the price index and Pt,t is the price that is chosen by the fraction
(1 − α) of firms that get to adjust their price in period t. Let us assume a
policy in which price inflation is reduced to zero once and for all in some period
t = 0. Computing the ratio of Pt and Pt−1 and imposing
Pt
Pt−1
= 1, we find
that Pt,t = Pt−1. Thus, newly set prices in the post-disinflation state of the
economy are always equal to the prevailing price level. The reason is that firms
choose prices in a forward looking manner and face the identical problem in
every period. Since prices gradually converge, there is no source for oscillatory
behavior in the economy. The increase in macroeconomic volatility resulting
from the disinflation policy applied in our model is thus a result that does not
obtain in Calvo-type staggering models.
3 Disinflation via Inflation Targeting in the Open
Economy
In this section, we investigate, how our conclusions from the previous section
change in an open economy setting. In particular, we show that the exchange
rate takes on a prominent role in alleviating wages from part of the burden of
reducing the inflation rate. In addition to the returns to scale in the production
function, the degree of openness of the economy is identified as a crucial factor
determining the magnitude of the oscillations in the post-disinflation state of
the economy. Moreover, we show that the nonlinear model delivers a set of
additional results that cannot be detected in the framework of the linearized
model.
3.1 Opening up the Model Economy
We now assume that the model economy is open in the sense that its agents
trade goods and assets with a foreign country. The model economy’s basic
structure is the same as in the previous section. In opening up the economy we
follow the formulation of Fender and Rankin (2008).
We assume that there are now two output sectors, one producing tradable
goods and one producing non-tradable goods. Output in the tradables sector YTt
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is exogenous and normalized to one. The production function for non-tradable
goods YNt is equivalent to equation (2.1) in the closed economy specification.
Markets for both types of goods are perfectly competitive. The foreign currency
price of tradables is normalized to unity. Together with the assumption that
the law of one price holds, this implies that PTt = Et, where Et is the nominal
exchange rate, i.e. the domestic price of foreign currency. As regards financial
markets, Bt is now an international bond traded between home and foreign
agents. The currency of its denomination is immaterial since we assume that
there are no initial outstanding bonds and there is no uncertainty after the
disinflation policy is applied. A no-arbitrage condition implies interest rate
parity
It = I
∗
t
Et+1
Et
(3.1)
where I∗t is the foreign gross interest rate. The optimization problems of the
individual agents are equivalent to the closed economy case except that house-
holds now consume both non-tradable and tradable goods. Their preference
structure is revealed by the composite consumption index
Cjt = C
α
NjtC
1−α
Tjt (3.2)
where 0 < α < 1 and CNjt and CTjt denote household j’s consumption of
nontradables and tradables respectively. Utility from consumption is maximized
subject to a given nominal spending constraint Sjt defined by Sjt = PNtCNjt+
PTtCTjt such that
CNjt = αSt/PNt (3.3)
CTjt = (1 − α)St/PTt (3.4)
where α is the degree of home bias in consumption. We denote 1 − α the
degree of openness of the economy. The consumer price index (CPI) is then a
weighted average of the price of tradables and non-tradables. In particular,
Pt =
PαNtP
1−α
Tt
αα(1− α)1−α
(3.5)
The trade balance Tt can be expressed as Tt = 1 − CTt. In principle, the
trade balance may be different from zero, indicating a trade surplus or deficit.
Over time deficits must be balanced by surpluses and initial net foreign assets.
A modified no-Ponzi game condition therefore reads
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−I−1B−1 =
∞∑
t=0
[I0I1...It−1]
−1PTtTt (3.6)
However, Fender and Rankin (2008) show that the assumptions of zero initial
net foreign assets and the exogeneity of output in the tradables sector together
imply that the trade balance is zero at any point in time. This result significantly
simplifies the analysis as it allows to abstract from any dynamics introduced by
the accumulation of net foreign assets. The log-linear definitions and equilibrium
conditions of the open economy model can be found in Appendix A.
3.2 The Role of the Degree of Openness of the Economy
In opening up the model economy we left its basic structure unchanged. This
implies that the initial constant inflation steady state (CISS) is the same as in
the previous section. We can thus directly proceed to derive the post-disinflation
path of the open economy. To fix language, we denote 1 − α the degree of
openness of the economy. The disinflation policy is defined in the exact same
way as before and is applied to reduce the rate of price inflation from its initial
rate µI to the new target µD in period t = 0. We begin the analysis by noticing
that price inflation in period t can be expressed as
pt − pt−1 = (1− ασ)(et − et−1) + ασ(wt − wt−1) (3.7)
This implies that a reduction in CPI inflation can be the result of a reduction
in wage inflation, an exchange rate appreciation or both.15 It suggests that
the post-disinflation path of wages may be subject to oscillations of a smaller
magnitude than in the closed economy model if the exchange rate adjusts to
alleviate them of part of the burden of reducing the inflation rate. In order to
investigate this issue, we proceed as in the previous case and express the wage
setting condition as
xt =
1
1 + β
[
2γ
1 + γ
(
1
1− ασ
pt −
1
2
ασ
1− ασ
(xt + xt−1)) +
1− γ
1 + γ
xt−1]
+
β
1 + β
[
2γ
1 + γ
(
1
1− ασ
pt+1 −
1
2
ασ
1− ασ
(xt+1 + xt)) +
1− γ
1 + γ
xt+1] (3.8)
Notice that setting α = 1, we are back at equation (2.32), the post-disinflation
law of motion in the closed economy setting. The subsequent steps are thus
equivalent to the analysis in the previous section. We again define φt = xt− pt.
15The reason is that the foreign price of tradables is assumed to be constant.
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The law of motion of the open economy in the post-disinflation state is then
given by
φt+1 −
1 + β
β
1− ασ + γ
1− ασ − γ
φt +
1
β
φt−1 = µD(
1− β
β
−
2γ
1− ασ − γ
) (3.9)
The stability proof in Appendix B.1 shows that (3.9) is saddlepoint stable
as one of its eigenvalues lies within and the other outside the unit circle. This
result holds for any choice of parameter values within the defined limits. We
again use the eigenvalue-eigenvector solution technique of Blanchard and Kahn
(1980) to solve the model. As (3.9) is a scalar second order difference equation
and its RHS is constant over time, its rational expectations solution is given by
φt = λ1φt−1 − µD
(1− β)/β − 2γ/(1− ασ − γ)
λ2 − 1
(3.10)
where λ1 denotes the eigenvalue that is smaller in absolute value and λ2
denotes the one that is bigger. Appendix B.2 shows that the condition for the
presence of oscillations in the post-disinflation state of the economy is now given
by 1− ασ − γ < 0. This suggests that an economy that is more closed is more
likely to be subject to oscillatory behavior after the disinflation policy is applied.
The reason is simply that the exchange rate takes a more significant share in the
burden of reducing the rate of CPI inflation, the larger is the share of tradable
goods in the consumption bundle and the price index.
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate these results. We have chosen the same parameter-
izations as in Figures 2 and 3 except that α now takes the value 0.9 in Figure 4
and the value 0.1 in Figure 5. A first look at the graphs shows that the exchange
rate behaves in a qualitatively equivalent fashion as the new wage. In Figure
4 it initially appreciates and then follows an oscillatory path until it converges
to its ZISS level. In Figure 5 the convergence process is monotonic. The ex-
change rate appreciates on impact and then gradually depreciates towards its
ZISS value. Finally, notice that the oscillations in Figure 4 are of a slightly
smaller magnitude than in Figure 2. This is in line with the intuition that the
exchange rate contributes to a smoother post-disinflation path of the economy.
In sum, the exchange rate alleviates wages from part of the burden of reduc-
ing the inflation rate when the economy is open. The more open is the economy,
the larger is the role played by the exchange rate and the smaller is the mag-
nitude of the oscillations in the post-disinflation state of the economy. Even in
the case of constant returns to scale in the production function, the economy
always converges to a new steady state and oscillations are never permanent.
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Figure 4: Price Inflation Targeting with Oscillations
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Figure 5: Price Inflation Targeting without Oscillations
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3.3 The Nonlinear Open Economy
In this subsection, we investigate the impact of the disinflation policy on the
open economy when the model is not linearized. We do so in order to illustrate
that the log-linear model hides interesting findings by eliminating the model’s
non-linearities. In particular, we show that a disinflation from a constant infla-
tion rate to zero cannot be implemented for any realistic parametrization of the
model when the returns to scale in the production function are constant and the
economy is closed. The reason is that the actions of the policymaker are in this
case constrained by a liquidity trap. The case of a partial reduction in inflation
is then even more problematic. If inflation is to be reduced to a positive new
target, there is no perfect foresight solution to the model at all. However, in
the subsequent subsection we show that these constraints are exclusive to the
special case of of a closed economy and constant returns to scale.
3.3.1 The Initial Constant Inflation Steady State
As in the previous section, we assume that the economy is initially in a CISS in
which real variables are constant and all nominal variables grow at the constant
inflation rate µI =
Mt
Mt−1
.16 We again first determine the CISS solution of the
model. In order to derive an expression for nontradables output in the CISS,
we proceed as before and find that
YN = A[(
(12 +
1
2µ
ε−1
I )
−ζ + βµζI(
1
2 +
1
2µ
1−ε
I )
−ζ
(12 +
1
2µ
ε−1
I )
−1 + β(12 +
1
2µ
1−ε
I )
−1
)
1
ζ (
1
2
+
1
2
µε−1I )
1
1−ε ]−σ (3.11)
where A = ( 1σα )
−σ( εε−1
ηζ
δ (σα)
ζ−1)−
σ
ζ > 0. The rate of money growth enters
the expression for nontradables output in a more complex fashion than in the
linearized version of the model. We now identify three channels through which
the rate of money growth µI affects nontradables output in the CISS, namely
the ’discounting channel’, the ’productivity channel’ and the ’disutility channel’.
The intuition behind these channels is discussed in Appendix C.17
We move on to derive the CISS solution for the wage index one period before
disinflation. Applying the same procedure as in the previous section, we have
that
W−1 = M−1V [
1
2
+
1
2
µε−1I ]
1
1−ε (3.12)
16Note that the definition of µI has changed. The definition of µD changes accordingly.
17Note that in the linearized version of the model, there is only one, namely the ’discounting
channel’.
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where V is given by
V =
1
Z
[
ε
ε− 1
ηζ
δ
(σα)ζ−1
(12 +
1
2µ
ε−1
I )
−ζ + βµζI(
1
2 +
1
2µ
1−ε
I )
−ζ
(12 +
1
2µ
ε−1
I )
−1 + β(12 +
1
2µ
1−ε
I )
−1
]
1
ζ (3.13)
where Zt =
Mt
St
and where, assuming that there is no foreign inflation, the
money demand function and the interest rate parity condition imply that
Z =
1− δ
δ
µI
µI − β
(3.14)
Equations (3.11) and (3.12) determine the state of the economy one period
before disinflation.18
3.3.2 The Special Case: Closed Economy with Constant Returns to
Scale
We initially focus on the special case of a closed economy and constant returns
to scale in the production function. The supply equation (2.3) shows that, as
in the linearized version of the model, these assumptions imply that a policy
of CPI inflation targeting is equivalent to one of wage inflation targeting. We
concentrate on the particular case of µD = 1 at first. In solving for the post-
disinflation path of the economy, we follow the same procedure as in the case of
the linearized model.
It is straightforward to determine what the disinflation policy implies for
wages set from period t = 0 onwards. We use the wage index and impose that
the rate of inflation is equal to µI until period t = −1 and to µD = 1 thereafter.
We find that in all odd periods starting with period one,
Xt = X−1 (3.15)
and in all even periods starting with period zero,
Xt = X−2 =
X−1
µI
(3.16)
The wage setting condition (2.10) can, in a complete markets equilibrium,
be expressed as
Xt = [
ε
ε− 1
ηζ
δ
W εζt N
ζ
t + βW
εζ
t+1N
ζ
t+1
W εt Nt/St + βW
ε
t+1Nt+1/St+1
]
1
1+ε(ζ−1) (3.17)
18The disinflation policy is unexpected such that the expectation of S0
S
−1
as of period t = −1
must be µI .
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We substitute for the wage index and eliminate employment. This yields
Xt = [
ε
ε− 1
ηζ
δ
(σα)ζ−1(
1
2
X1−εt +
1
2
X1−εt−1 )
1−ζ S
ζ
t + βS
ζ
t+1
1 + β
]
1
1+ε(ζ−1) (3.18)
This relationship holds for all t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞. Evaluating (3.18) at each
particular time period and using (3.15) and (3.16), we find that
St+2 = [[S
γ
t − (M−1V )
ζ 1 + β
ε
ε−1
ηζ
δ (σα)
ζ−1(12 +
1
2B
1−ε)1−ζ
(1− βB1+ε(ζ−1))]/β2]
1
ζ
(3.19)
St+2 = [[S
γ
t − (M−1V )
ζ 1 + β
ε
ε−1
ηζ
δ (σα)
ζ−1(12 +
1
2B
1−ε)1−ζ
(B1+ε(ζ−1) − β)]/β2]
1
ζ
(3.20)
in odd and even periods respectively, where B = (12 +
1
2µ
ε−1
I )
1
1−ε /(12 +
1
2µ
1−ε
I )
1
1−ε .
Equations (3.19) and (3.20) represent the fundamental laws of motion of
the economy in the post-disinflation state. In order to learn about the stability
properties of the two equations, we differentiate both and evaluate them at
their respective steady states. The resulting expressions turn out not to be
analytically tractable. We are thus left with the option to establish stability
results for given parameter values. We therefore compute the slope of each
of the two equations at their respective steady states for various combinations
of parameter values within the defined limits. We find a robust result across
all parameterizations, namely that both equations exhibit a slope greater than
one at their respective steady states and are thus locally unstable. The unique
non divergent solution of (3.19) and (3.20) must therefore be given by their
respective steady states. We proceed to rule out unstable solutions as in the
previous section. In the post-disinflation state, nominal consumption is thus
given by
St = [(M−1V )
ζ 1 + β
ε
ε−1
ηζ
δ (σα)
ζ−1(12 +
1
2B
1−ε)1−ζ
(1− βB1+ε(ζ−1))/(1− β2)]1/ζ
(3.21)
St = [(M−1V )
ζ 1 + β
ε
ε−1
ηζ
δ (σα)
ζ−1(12 +
1
2B
1−ε)1−ζ
(B1+ε(ζ−1) − β)/(1− β2)]1/ζ
(3.22)
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in odd and even periods respectively. The results show that, as in the lin-
earized version of the model, nominal consumption fluctuates between even and
odd periods throughout future periods in the special case of µD = 1. The same
is true for money supply which is given as a function of nominal consumption
by
Mt =
1− δ
δ
St
1− βSt/St+1
(3.23)
However, taking a closer look at (3.22), we observe that a steady state solu-
tion for nominal consumption does not exist in even periods for sufficiently large
values of µI . We know that the initial rate of money growth µI is greater than
one. Thus, B < 1. In fact, B decreases with µI . For sufficiently large values
of µI , the term B
1+ε(ζ−1) − β is negative. This implies that the steady state
solution for nominal consumption in even periods does not exist. The reason is
the following: nominal consumption is high in odd periods in which wage setters
set high wages. It is low in even periods in which wage setters set low wages. A
large µI implies a high degree of wage dispersion and thus strong oscillations in
macro variables. For sufficiently large values of µI , the wage set in even periods
becomes arbitrarily small and so does nominal consumption. Eventually, there
is no positive level of nominal consumption in even periods that is consistent
with the wage setting behavior of households and the disinflation policy becomes
infeasible.19
The constraint B1+ε(ζ−1)−β ≥ 0 does not, however, turn out to be binding
in this model. The reason is that there is a second constraint for the policy to
be feasible which takes the form of a liquidity trap. The set of combinations
of parameter values that do not violate the second constraint is a strict subset
of those that do not violate the first. This implies that there are cases in
which the economy hits the liquidity trap although a solution for even periods’
nominal consumption exists. In order to fully understand why the economy hits
a liquidity trap in this framework, notice that the consumption Euler equation
(2.8) is given by
It =
1
β
St+1
St
(3.24)
The optimal intertemporal choice of consumption requires the nominal inter-
est rate to be low in odd periods in order to induce a fall in nominal consumption
19The maximum size of the initial inflation rate µI for which the disinflation policy is still
feasible in terms of this constraint depends on the choice of parameter values. Unsurprisingly,
it hinges crucially on the parameters β, ε and ζ. The reason is that these parameters determine
the wage setting behavior of households and thereby the amplitude of the oscillations in macro
variables. The greater is the magnitude of each of these parameters, the stronger incentives
must be set to induce the required wage setting behavior on the part of the households.
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Table 1: Maximum Value of µI Allowing the Policymaker to Avoid the Liquidity
Trap
β ε ζ µI
0.90 1.4 1.2 1.0052
0.95 3.5 1.4 1.0007
0.95 4.5 1.9 1.0004
0.97 6.0 2.5 1.0001
in the subsequent even period. Similarly, a rise in nominal consumption in odd
periods requires a high nominal interest rate in the previous even period. The
money demand function in equation (2.9) shows that the interest rate increase
in even periods causes a fall in even periods’ money demand, while the decrease
in odd periods causes a rise in odd periods’ money demand. The Euler equation
and the money demand function taken together imply the following: the greater
are the oscillations in nominal consumption that the disinflation policy produces
in the post disinflation state, i.e. the smaller is St+1St in odd periods, the smaller
is the nominal interest rate in even periods. As St+1St approaches β, the nominal
interest rate approaches its lower bound It = 1 and money demand approaches
infinity. For St+1St < β, the nominal interest rate becomes (notionally) smaller
than one and the demand for money flicks from infinity to negative infinity.
Mathematically, the reason is that the demand for money is a hyperbola as
equation (2.9) shows. Intuitively, the key insight is that the strict disinflation
policy hits the lower bound of the nominal interest rate. For a sufficiently strong
reduction in inflation, there is no odd periods’ nominal interest rate It > 1 that
could induce an upward jump in money demand of the magnitude that is re-
quired for the policy to work. The monetary authority is thus constrained by a
liquidity trap.
Table 1 lists the maximum feasible initial inflation rates that do not violate
this feasibility constraint for given parameterizations. It is immediately obvious
that the constraint is too strict for the policy to be of any practical relevance
in this case.
The above results imply that for sufficiently high initial inflation rates it may
not be possible for the monetary authority to set the future path of its policy
instrument such that the inflation rate is immediately reduced to zero and the
zero inflation rate is sustained throughout future periods. The magnitude of the
feasible reductions in the inflation rate is surprisingly small. If one considers
the last two cases in Table 1 to be realistic calibrations, the analysis implies
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that the maximum feasible rate of wage inflation which can be immediately and
permanently reduced to zero amounts to less than 0.05 percent. The disinflation
policy admittedly is very strict. But the results suggest that a complete inflation
reduction is infeasible for any practical purposes. An analysis of the effects of
the use of strict inflation targeting to reduce the rate of inflation from a positive
to a lower positive value therefore suggests itself.
In the framework of the linearized model, we found that the nature of the
disinflation policy’s impact on the economy in the case of a partial reduction of
inflation is equivalent to the particular case of eliminating inflation alltogether.
In the nonlinear model, however, it turns out that there is no equilibrium of
the model that could support such a policy. In particular, the inflation rate
cannot be kept at the new target after disinflation throughout all future periods.
Due to the nonlinearity in the wage index formula, the new wage is subject to
fluctuations between even and odd periods which grow over time. The new wage
set in one of the two sectors grows, while the other falls and eventually hits its
zero lower bound. Hence, an equilibrium does not exist. Surprisingly, this is
not the case if the inflation rate µI is reduced to a new but negative inflation
target 0 < µD < 1. Intuitive explanations as well as mathematical proofs for
these findings are given in Appendix D.
3.3.3 The General Case: Open Economy and Decreasing Returns to
Scale
The purpose of the present section is to show that both a complete and a partial
disinflation of an empirically relevant size are possible in the nonlinear model
if one abstracts from the special case of a closed economy and constant returns
to scale. The post-disinflation path of the economy moreover looks strikingly
similar to the equivalent case in the log-linear model.
As before we solve for the post-disinflation path of the economy by focusing
on its law of motion, i.e. the wage setting condition, which can be expressed as
Xt = [
ε
ε− 1
ηζ
δ
W εζt Y
ζ/σ
Nt + βW
εζ
t+1Y
ζ/σ
Nt+1
W εt Y
1/σ
Nt /St + βW
ε
t+1Y
1/σ
Nt+1/St+1
]
1
1+ε(ζ−1) (3.25)
As in the case of the linearized model, we need to normalize all nominal
variables by the price level before we can solve the model. For each nominal
variable Qt we define Q˜t =
Qt
Pt
. Using this definition as well as the fact that
Pt+1 = PtµD in the post-disinflation state, it is straightforward to show that
the following system of equations determines the post-disinflation path of the
economy:
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X˜t = [
ε
ε− 1
ηζ
δ
W˜ εζt Y
ζ/σ
Nt + β(W˜t+1µD)
εζY
ζ/σ
Nt+1
W˜ εt Y
1/σ
Nt /S˜t + β(W˜t+1µD)
εY
1/σ
Nt+1/(S˜t+1µD)
]
1
1+ε(ζ−1) (3.26)
αα = P˜αNtS˜
1−α
t (3.27)
W˜t = [0.5X˜
1−ε
t + 0.5(
X˜t−1
µD
)1−ε]
1
1−ε (3.28)
YNt = (
σαS˜t
W˜t
)σ (3.29)
P˜Nt = (αS˜t)
1−σ(W˜t/σ)
σ (3.30)
We need to resort to numerical methods to solve this system of equations. A
set of initial conditions can be derived based on equations (3.11) and (3.12). The
latter define the state of the economy one period before disinflation. As a solu-
tion procedure, we use the Newton-type algorithm first proposed by Laffargue
(1990).20
Figures 6 and 7 consider a disinflation from two percent down to price sta-
bility. The solid lines represent the post-disinflation path of the economy in the
log-linear version of the model using the same parameterizations as in Figures
2 and 3.21 The dashed lines represent the corresponding path of the economy
in the full nonlinear model. It is immediately obvious that a disinflation of a
realistic size is indeed possible in the nonlinear version of the model. Moreover,
not only is the post-disinflation path of the model economy qualitatively equiv-
alent to the case of the log-linear version of the model, it is even quantitatively
very similar. While the magnitude of the fluctuations in nominal variables is
greater in the nonlinear model, the movements in output are almost precisely
of the same magnitude. This implies that we can draw an equivalent set of con-
clusions from these results as we did in the previous section for the log-linear
version of the model.
Figures 8 and 9 present the results from reducing the rate of price inflation
from 5 percent to 3 percent. The nominal variables are shown as normalized
by the price index. It is immediately obvious that, contrary to the special case
of a closed economy and constant returns to scale, not only disinflations of an
empirically relevant size but also gradual disinflations are now possible. As
in the log-linear version of the model, the qualitative conclusions arising from
20The algorithm is employed in Dynare for the solution of deterministic models.
21We converted the values from log deviations back to level terms.
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Figure 6: Price Inflation with Oscillations: Comparison of Linear and Nonlinear
Model
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partial disinflations are the same as in the case of a complete disinflation to
price stability.
4 Discussion
The present study was motivated by the idea that inflation targeting differs
from other disinflation policies in important respects. In particular, a strict
interpretation of an inflation target allows the policymaker to tolerate no devi-
ations from target. But adjusting the policy instrument such that the inflation
target is attained and defending the new target rigorously may preserve infla-
tionary distortions such as wage and price differentials to an exceptional degree.
The implications of these distortions might be severe for both real activity and
volatility in the economy. In order to formalize this idea, we have used an open
economy Dynamic General Equilibrium Model with wage staggering of the type
suggested by Taylor (1979a) to consider a rather extreme case of a disinflation
policy: an immediate and permanent reduction in the rate of CPI inflation to a
newly set target. We found that the disinflation policy not only creates a slump
in output on impact, but can additionally generate oscillatory behavior in both
nominal and real variables along their post-disinflation adjustment path. These
oscillations can be permanent when the economy is closed and the returns to
labor in the production function are constant. This is also the only case in which
the economy does not gradually converge to a new steady state. Moreover, we
showed that the size of the initial slowdown in real activity and the magnitude
of the oscillations are positively related.
From a modeling perspective, the analysis has shown that the presence of
oscillations along the adjustment path would not occur in a model with a Calvo
(1983) type staggering structure as in Yun (2005). In the framework of the
particular model we employed, we found that the presence of oscillations along
the post-disinflation path of the economy as well as their magnitude strongly
depend on the desired size of the reduction in the inflation rate as well as the
returns to labor in the production function and the degree of openness of the
economy. In particular, we illustrated that there are no oscillations at all along
the post-disinflation path of the economy if the returns to labor are sufficiently
low and the economy is rather open. At the other extreme, in the case of
constant returns to scale and and a closed economy, the oscillations are large
and permanent. The reason is that, in the latter case, CPI inflation targeting
becomes equivalent to a policy of wage inflation targeting and the exchange rate
looses its role as a stabilizer.
The present study is in line with the analysis of Yun (2005) in that it iden-
32
tifies the slow convergence of prices as the major source of inefficiency resulting
from an unexpected, immediate and permanent reduction in the inflation rate.
Moreover, the analysis has shown that the negative consequences of strict in-
flation targeting identified by Svensson (2000) may be exacerbated when the
policy is used as a disinflation regime. We interpret this as an explanation for
the finding of Roger and Stone (2005) that target misses are particularly com-
mon for disinflating inflation targeters despite the fact that monetary authorities
in these economies should be particularly eager to avoid credibility losses.22 In
sum, there are good reasons to be cautious when adopting inflation targeting
as a disinflation regime. This may be particularly true for emerging market
economies which have a limited experience with an independent monetary au-
thority.
22The authors provide evidence that suggests that central banks rather shift up the planned
trajectory for the inflation rate than tightening policy in order not to deviate from it. This
behavior complies with the concept of opportunistic disinflation proposed by Clifton (1999).
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Appendix
A Log-linear Definitions and Equations
In the following equations lower-case symbols denote log deviations of vari-
ables from their reference steady state values, i.e. vt = log
Vt
VR
:
A.1 The Closed Economy
µt+1 = mt+1 −mt (A.1)
st = pt + ct (A.2)
mt − pt = ct −
β
1− β
it (A.3)
st+1 − st = it (A.4)
yt =
σ
1− σ
(pt − wt) (A.5)
xt =
1
1 + ε(ζ − 1)
[
1
1 + β
[st + ε(ζ − 1)wt + (ζ − 1)nt]
+
β
1 + β
[st+1 + ε(ζ − 1)wt+1 + (ζ − 1)nt+1]] (A.6)
wt =
1
2
xt +
1
2
xt−1 (A.7)
nt =
1
σ
yt (A.8)
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A.2 The Open Economy
µt+1 = mt+1 −mu (A.9)
st = pt + ct (A.10)
mt − pt = ct −
β
1− β
it (A.11)
st+1 − st = it (A.12)
et+1 − et = it (A.13)
yNt =
σ
1− σ
(pNt − wt) (A.14)
yTt = 0 (A.15)
cNt = st − pNt (A.16)
cTt = st − et (A.17)
pt = αpNt + (1− α)et (A.18)
1
α
yt = yNt (A.19)
τt = −cTt (A.20)
xt =
1
1 + ε(ζ − 1)
[
1
1 + β
[st + ε(ζ − 1)wt + (ζ − 1)nt]
+
β
1 + β
[st+1 + ε(ζ − 1)wt+1 + (ζ − 1)nt+1]] (A.21)
wt =
1
2
xt +
1
2
xt−1 (A.22)
nt =
1
σ
yNt (A.23)
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B Price Inflation Targeting
In the following, we show in a first step that there is a unique perfect foresight
solution for the law of motion of the economy in the post-disinflation state
when either σ < 1 or α < 1. In a second step, we show that the sign of the
smaller eigenvalue depends on the degree of returns to labor σ and the degree
of openness of the economy 1 − α as well as the parameters ζ and ε. In the
special case of α = 1 and σ = 1 a saddlepath equilibrium does not exist. The
proofs are outlined for the open-economy setting but hold equivalently in the
closed economy setting if α is set to unity.
B.1 Stability
As long as α < 1 or σ < 1, the system of equations determining the law of
motion of the economy in the post-disinflation steady state has exactly one
stable eigenvalue such that there is a unique perfect foresight solution. To see
this, notice that the law of motion of the economy is given by
φt+1 −
1 + β
β
1− ασ + γ
1− ασ − γ
φt +
1
β
φt−1 = µD(
1− β
β
−
2γ
1− ασ − γ
) (B.1)
The characteristic equation of this 2nd order difference equation is given by
ω2 + bω + c = 0 (B.2)
where b = − 1+ββ
1−ασ+γ
1−ασ−γ and c =
1
β . Notice that in the special case of α = 1
and σ = 1, the two eigenvalues of this difference equation are readily derived as
λ1 = −1 and λ2 = −
1
β , implying that one eigenvalue lies on the unit circle and
the economy will never converge. In order to prove stability for all other cases,
we apply standard results from the continuous time case. In particular, we
define the variable z such that z = ω−1ω+1 and ω =
1+z
1−z .
23 We therefore transform
the equation to
(1 − b+ c)z2 + 2(1− c)z + (1 + b+ c) = 0 (B.3)
Applying standard results for a continuous time characteristic equation, the
following condition must hold for the characteristic equation to have exactly one
stable eigenvalue.
1 + b+ c
1− b+ c
< 0 (B.4)
23A stable eigenvalue in the continuous time case has a negative real part. It can be shown
that ω lies in the unit circle if and only if z has a negative real part.
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After some manipulations we have
1 + b+ c
1− b+ c
= −
γ
1− ασ
(B.5)
And since α, σ < 1, it is clear that this expression is strictly negative. We
can conclude that for any parameterization within the restrictions given, there
will be exactly one stable eigenvalue. This implies that there is a unique perfect
foresight solution to the model and the economy ultimately converges to a new
steady state. In the special case of α = 1 and σ = 1 a saddlepath equilibrium
does not exist.
B.2 The Sign of the Smaller Eigenvalue
We call p(ω) the 2nd order characteristic polynomial function in ω, i.e. the LHS
of the characteristic equation. We have shown that there is one and only one
stable eigenvalue when α < 1 or σ < 1. This implies that the characteristic
function cuts the horizontal axis precisely once within the range (−1, 1). Now,
suppose that the stable eigenvalue is of a positive sign. This implies that p(0)
and p(1) must be of opposite sign. Therefore, for the unique stable eigenvalue
to be of a positive sign, the following condition must hold:
c
1 + b+ c
< 0 (B.6)
After some manipulations
1−
1− ασ + γ
1− ασ − γ
< 0 (B.7)
Noticing that multiplying by the denominator of the fraction might involve
multiplying by a negative number, we find that the condition is fulfilled if and
only if 1 − ασ − γ > 0, where γ = ζ1+ε(ζ−1) . This implies that the unique and
stable eigenvalue will be negative for sufficiently high α and σ and sufficiently
small ζ and ε.
C The Effect of the Rate of Money Growth on
Non-Tradables Output
In this section, we discuss the three channels through which the rate of money
growth affects non-tradables output in the constant inflation steady state (CISS)
in the framework of the full non-linear model.
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(1) Discounting Channel : Under wage staggering, the wage that households
set in period t has to lie between the ideal wage for period t and the projected
ideal wage for period t+1. Under positive inflation, the ideal wage for period t
must be lower than the one for period t+1. And as individuals discount future
utility according to the discounting parameter β < 1, the wage set in period
t will be set closer to the ideal current wage than to the projected ideal wage
for the subsequent period. This, in turn, allows firms to employ more labor at
the same cost and increases output. The magnitude of the effect increases the
greater is the dispersion between the two ideal wages, i.e. the greater is µI . In
sum, µI has a positive effect on equilibrium output due to its depressing effect
on real wages through the discounting parameter β.24
(2) Productivity Channel : In the presence of inflation, the optimal wage
in period t is smaller than the optimal wage in period t+1. Wage staggering
then implies that in an arbitrary period t, wages differ between the sector that
has just adjusted its wage and the sector whose wage is prevailing from the
previous period. This implies that inflation creates wage dispersion between
households with the two sectors alternating in setting the higher wage.25 To
be able to infer what wage dispersion implies for equilibrium output, notice
that labor skills are imperfect substitutes in the production function. This
implies that, ceteris paribus, using equal amounts of each labor type yields
a higher average productivity of labor than using unequal amounts. In the
presence of wage dispersion, profit maximizing firms substitute labor from the
low wage sector for labor from the high wage sector. This choice is optimal
under wage dispersion but is inefficient in comparison with conditions under
which households in different sectors set the same wages and supply the same
amounts of labor and thus attain a higher level of average productivity per
unit of labor.26 In sum, inflation creates wage dispersion which leads to labor
substitution and a reduction in productivity. The higher is ε, the less severe is
this effect. However, the less severe the effect is, the more do firms engage into
labor substitution and the lower is the level of output attained in equilibrium.
(3) Disutility Channel : We have elaborated on the fact that wage dispersion
induces firms to substitute labor from the low wage sector for labor from the
high wage sector. As long as ζ > 1, the resulting intertemporal fluctuation
24The smaller is β, the lower will households set their wages.
25The exact same degree of wage dispersion that is present in the CISS will be preserved in
the post-disinflation state due to the particular nature of the disinflation policy.
26These conditions are for instance satisfied in the ZISS around which we have linearized
the equilibrium conditions in the previous section.
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Figure 10: Effect of the Inflation Rate on Nontradables Output
in the demand for a given household’s labor supply increases the disutility the
household derives from providing it. This increase in disutility induces house-
holds to demand compensation payments in the form of wage increases. The
higher the degree of wage dispersion, the greater the increase in the wage level
and hence the greater the reduction in output. In sum, µI has a negative effect
on equilibrium output in the CISS as it increases the overall disutility of work
effort. This effect is stronger the greater is ζ.
Figure 10 illustrates the effect of µI on CISS output. The impact of a
marginal increase in inflation varies across different levels of the inflation rate.
An increase in the inflation rate affects output positively if the inflation rate is
rather low. The reason is that, at low rates of inflation, the ’discounting channel’
dominates. The greater is µI , the stronger is the degree of wage dispersion
and the more do the ’productivity channel’ and the ’disutility channel’ gain
in relative importance. For sufficiently large values of µI , the net effect of a
marginal increase in µI on output is negative. This implies that the distortion
resulting from an additional percentage point of inflation worsens with the size
of the rate of inflation. The smaller the magnitude of β, ζ and ε, the stronger is
the discounting channel relative to the productivity channel and the disutility
channel.27
27Ascari (1998) and Graham and Snower (2004) derive the effect of money growth on output
in similar frameworks and reach the same qualitative conclusion.
42
D Impossibility of a Partial Reduction in the
Rate of Wage Inflation
We show in a first step that X0X
−1
= X2X1 holds only in the special case of µD = 1.
This implies that in all other cases the economy is not in the post-disinflation
state characterized by perpetual oscillations immediately after the policy is ap-
plied. The second step is to show that there is no convergence process of the
ratio XtXt−1 =
Xt+2
Xt+1
to its steady state XtXt−1 = µD thereafter if 1 < µD < µI .
The steady state is unstable and the disinflation policy is infeasible.
Proposition D.1. The equality X0X
−1
= X2X1 holds in the post-disinflation state
only in the special case of µD = 1.
Proof. The ratio of the wage index in period t and its first lag is given by
Wt
Wt−1
=
[12X
1−ε
t +
1
2X
1−ε
t−1 ]
1
1−ε
[12X
1−ε
t−1 +
1
2X
1−ε
t−2 ]
1
1−ε
(D.1)
Setting WtWt−1 = µD and manipulating yields
Xt
Xt−1
= (µ1−εD (1 + (
Xt−2
Xt−1
)1−ε)− 1)
1
1−ε (D.2)
This implies that we have
X0
X−1
= (µ1−εD (1 + µ
ε−1
I )− 1)
1
1−ε (D.3)
X1
X0
= (µ1−εD (1 + (
X−1
X0
)1−ε)− 1)
1
1−ε (D.4)
X2
X1
= (µ1−εD (1 + (
X0
X1
)1−ε)− 1)
1
1−ε (D.5)
etc. I will now show that for a given ε the equality X0X
−1
= X2X1 only holds if
µD = 1 and/or if µD = µI . Plugging (D.4) into (D.5), we have
X2
X1
= (µ1−εD (1 + (µ
1−ε
D (1 + (
X−1
X0
)1−ε)− 1)−1)− 1)
1
1−ε (D.6)
Now using (D.3),
X2
X1
= (µ1−εD (1 + (µ
1−ε
D (1 + (µ
1−ε
D (1 + µ
ε−1
I )− 1)
−1)− 1)−1)− 1)
1
1−ε (D.7)
Now we set the RHS of (D.7) equal to the RHS of (D.3). We obtain
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µ1−εD (1 + µ
ε−1
I ) = µ
1−ε
D (1 + (µ
1−ε
D (1 + (µ
1−ε
D (1 + µ
ε−1
I )− 1)
−1)− 1)−1) (D.8)
and finally after some simplification
µ1−εI + 1 = µ
1−ε
D + (1 + µ
ε−1
I − µ
ε−1
D )
−1 (D.9)
For a given ε, there are only two positive real valued solutions to this equa-
tion. These are µD = 1 and µD = µI . This proves the above proposition.
Proposition D.2. If 1 < µD < µI , then the steady state
Xt
Xt−1
= µD is locally
unstable and it is impossible to carry out the disinflation policy. If 0 < µD < 1,
then the steady state XtXt−1 = µD is locally stable and the disinflation policy can
be carried out.
Proof. From equation (D.2) in Proposition D.1 we have that
(
Xt
Xt−1
)1−ε = µ1−εD (1 + (
Xt−1
Xt−2
)ε−1)− 1 (D.10)
We define ( XtXt−1 )
1−ε = rt. Then we have the first order non-linear difference
equation
rt = µ
1−ε
D − 1 +
µ1−εD
rt−1
(D.11)
This difference equation has a steady state at r = µ1−εD or r = −1. A negative
value of r is economically meaningless. Hence, the only economically meaningful
steady state is r = µ1−εD , which implies that
Xt
Xt−1
= µD. Furthermore, notice
that differentiating rt with respect to its one period lag and evaluating the
derivative at the steady state yields a value of 1
µ1−εD
, the slope of the phase line
at the steady state.
Case 1: 1 < µD < µI This case corresponds to a partial disinflation policy.
It is illustrated in figure 11. We begin by noticing that there is a natural
initial condition for rt, namely r0, which is predetermined in this setting. Given
this initial value for rt, the time path of rt is divergent as the steady state
is not locally stable. The reason is that the slope of the phase line given by
equation (D.11) is smaller than -1 at the SS. Its horizontal asymptote occurs
at a negative value for rt. This means that eventually rt < 0 which implies
that the disinflation policy cannot be carried out. However, notice that our
discussion here only covers local as opposed to global stability. As the economy
44
Figure 11: Case 1: Unstable Pattern
moves farther away from the steady state, and hence nonlinearities become more
important, it is possible that the economy behaves in an unexpected way. It
is for instance possible that it converges on a so-called 2-cycle, i.e. a path on
which fluctuations continue forever at the same amplitude. An analysis of global
stability, however, is not within the scope of this paper.
Case 2: 0 < µD < 1 This case corresponds to disinflation policy to a negative
inflation rate. It is illustrated in figure 12. Notice that rt is locally stable. The
reason is that the slope of the phase line given by equation (D.11) is greater
than -1 at the SS. Its horizontal asymptote occurs at a positive value for rt.
In contrast to Case 1, this implies that the time path of rt will follow a stable
pattern. The disinflation policy can thus be carried out.28.
Intuitively, the driving factor behind these results is the non(log)linearity
of the wage index Wt in Xt and Xt−1.
29 This non(log)linearity is due to the
fact that labor types are not perfectly complementary but at least partially
substitutable in the production function. Simply put, if households in one sector
set a lower wage than households in the other, the resulting wage index is not
given by the simple average of the two wages - as in the linearized version of
28As discussed above, notice that we only consider local stability.
29If the production function were of Cobb-Douglas type, the wage index would be loglinear
and labor types would be less easily substituted than in the present case.
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Figure 12: Case 2: Stable Pattern
the model - but by some value smaller than it. The reason is that firms will
substitute labor types from the low wage sector for labor types from the high
wage sector. Furthermore, firms will find it optimal to engage more strongly
into labor substitution the greater is the wage gap between the two sectors and
the greater is the elasticity of technical substitution between labor types, ε.
This labor substituting behavior of firms is the reason, why it is not possible
to keep wage growth at target throughout future periods after disinflation to
positive rate of inflation. In the following, we will contrast wage setting after
(a) a complete disinflation, (b) a disinflation to a positive rate of wage inflation
and (c) a disinflation towards a negative rate of wage inflation.
µD = 1 is the case of a complete disinflation. We have shown that a complete
disinflation implies that wages set in the post-disinflation state are constant
through time for each sector of households. Furthermore, these wages are equal
to the respective wage of each sector one period before disinflation. Therefore,
this is the one case in which the policy does not introduce dynamics into the
behavior of sectoral wages.
Let us now consider the case when 1 < µD < µI . Before starting the
discussion, it is helpful to take a quick look at Figure 1 in the main text which
illustrates the post-disinflation path of the new wage in the framework of the
linearized version of the model. The question is then, why we do not observe
equivalent patterns when investigating disinflations to positive new inflation
targets in the framework of the nonlinear model.
Let us assume that we are investigating a disinflation that implies a strong
enough reduction in the rate of wage inflation for the new wage in period t = 0 to
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be forced to fall below the prevailing new wage that was set in period t = −1.30
In the framework of the linearized model, we would be looking at case 1a in
which the new wage set in period zero is lower than in the previous period.
We have chosen the case in which the new inflation target is attained if X0
takes a value somewhere between X−1 and X−2. Now, for a given X−1 and
X−2, let X0A be the new wage that would attain the new inflation target in
period t = 0 in the absence of labor substitution. Notice that X0A > X−2
implies that sectoral wages are less far apart in period t = 0 than they were in
t = −1. Consequently, if we do allow for labor substitution in period t = 0,
firms substitute less labor away from the high wage sector in period t = 0 than
they did in period t = −1. This implies that the higher wage gains weight in
the wage index in period t = 0 relative to period t = −1 and thereby exerts
additional upward pressure on it. This ’labor substitution effect’ implies that
X0 must lie below X0A , the value it would have taken in the absence of labor
substitution. Therefore, in terms of log deviations from the reference steady
state, the new wage in period zero must be low relative to its counterpart in the
framework of the linearized model.
Moving on to period t = 1, the smaller is X0, the greater must agents choose
X1 in order to keep wage growth constant. Furthermore, the higher is X1, i.e.
the greater is the wage gap, the more do firms engage into labor substitution
away from the higher wage and the higher does X1 have to be chosen in order to
attain the new inflation target. This implies that the ’labor substitution effect’
that put downward pressure on X0 now exerts upward pressure on X1. And
it exerts more upward pressure on X1, the more downward pressure it exerted
on X0. The fluctuations in the new wage are therefore self-enforcing with the
result that the ratio XtXt−1 falls over time throughout even periods and increases
over time throughout odd periods until the new wage hits its zero lower bound
in even periods.
0 < µD < 1 is the rather unrealistic case of a reduction in wage inflation
towards a negative inflation rate. Here, the economy is saddlepath stable. The
ratio XtXt−1 converges towards its post-disinflation steady state
Xt
Xt−1
= µD. No-
tice that this result follows from the above argument as the magnitude of the
reduction in the inflation rate is so great that firms engage more strongly into
labor substitution in period t = 0 than they did in period t = −1.
30The reasoning is similar for the opposite case.
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